

EU'S INVOLVEMENT PROMOTING

A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

IN CUBA



DULCE PEREZ-CALLEJAS

Dulce holds a Bachelor's and Master's degree in European Studies and Political Sciences from Comenius University in Bratislava, her research focused in the European Union's development policies towards Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Cuba. She has been involved with international entities such as the United Nations Development Programme, USAID and Habitat for Humanity International, and collaborated with Civic Society Organizations from Slovakia, Mexico and Czech Republic. She currently resides in Mexico City working as an activist and consultant in project management.

HTURIDKSLAKFJAI
CXMYVBVUWIOZA
HFHYMIGLVXVLD
BIGZREDSYXCVGLI
HTURIDKSLAKFJAI
CXMYVBVUWIOZA
HFHYMEU'SVXVLD
BIINVOLVEMENTLI
YMPROMOTINGIVJ
BA DEMOCRATICIR
TZ TRANSITIONDC
RWMLIN CUBA MLIQ
BXMGLITUREFXVCV
AVNCBXVYGDTEZR
HTURIDKSLAKFJAI
CXMYVBVUWIOZA
HFHYMIGLVXVLD
BIGZREDSYXCVGLI

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	2
INTRODUCTION	2
EU AS AN INTERNATIONAL ADVOCATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY.....	3
EU'S INVOLVEMENT IN CUBA.....	3
DOES EU'S INVOLVEMENT IN CUBA RESEMBLE THE MOST SUCCESSFUL CASES OF EXTERNAL ACTORS' ENGAGEMENT IN CEE TRANSITIONS?	7
CONCLUSION.....	11
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	12

ABSTRACT

Since establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union has identified itself as an international promoter of democracy. In the case of its involvement in Cuba, EU's objective of encouraging a process of transition to a pluralist democracy was captured in the Common Position of 1996 and has been reaffirmed throughout the years. In order to determine what EU's role is in Cuba's transition to a democratic system, this article studies the nature of its involvement through the several documents, declarations, programmes and actions that the different EU

institutions and officials have made and taken for the promotion of democracy among the Cuban authorities and the Cuban people. The nature of EU's presence in Cuba is then compared to the patterns follow by the most successful cases of external actors' involvement in Central and Eastern European post-communist transitions. The results of this analysis reveals the pattern the EU has followed since 1996 for the promotion of a democratic transition and to what extend this pattern resembles the most successful cases of external involvement in Central and Eastern European transitions.

INTRODUCTION

The most successful cases of post-socialist transitions have occurred in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (Kornai, 2004) and studies on transitology in these countries coincide on the fact that the degree of success in transition is closely related to the presence of external actors and nature of their involvement (Atanasova, 2009) (Duarte Peña, 2007) (Kelley, 2004) (Stewart, 2009) (Arias-King, 2005). Since the European Union is identified as a key international actor in the process of democratic transition for CEE countries, it results relevant for the process of a democratic transition in Cuba to define the nature of its involvement and how much its involvement resembles the most successful cases of external actors' involvement in CEE transitions in order to explore the possibilities of a significant political influence as a promoter of democratic transition.

The EU has appointed itself as a promoter of a democratic transition in Cuba since 1996 through the publication its Common Position. The analysis of the documents, declarations, programmes and actions that EU institutions and EU officials have produced since then relating to their role as a democracy promoter in Cuba will

reveal the nature of EU's involvement in Cuba. In order to determine the role of the EU in Cuba's democratic transition, the nature of its involvement will be compared with the patterns observed in external actors' policies, programmes and actions in CEE transitions. This comparison will shed light on whether the EU is mirroring the most successful practices for promoting democracy in a communist regime as an external actor or if its practices lack of relevance in the achievement of a democratic transition.

EU'S INVOLVEMENT PROMOTING A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN CUBA

THE EU AS AN INTERNATIONAL ADVOCATE OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

With the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security policy the European Union set out “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Maastricht treaty, 1992) as one of the core objectives of its foreign policy.

This self-appointed role as an international advocate of democratic values and human rights has been re-stated in several occasions by different EU institutions

and officials. One landmark document is the European Parliament’s (2001) communication on EU’s role of promoting Human Rights and Democracy in third countries which established the promotion of these principles as a fundamental objective in all of EU’s foreign relations:

“Protecting human rights, promoting pluralist democracy and consolidating the rule of law are not only among the fundamental objectives of the European Union, but are also important principles for its external relations”.

EU’S INVOLVEMENT IN CUBA

Concerning Cuba, the first document establishing the parameters for EU’s relations with this Caribbean island is the Common Position of 1996 issued by the Council of the European Union. The Common Position, in line with EU’s role as a democracy advocate, states:

“The objective of the European Union in its relations with Cuba is to encourage a process of transition to a pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people” (Council of the European Union, 1996)

The Common Position is not only meant to guide EU relations with the Cuban government but also with

“all sectors of the Cuban society”. This policy is still valid today and throughout its biannual evaluations the Council of Europe has re-stated their commitment to it in and the need to comply with its parameters in all of EU relations with the Cuban government and the Cuban people.

The Common Position dictates bilateral relations to promote a change in the regime but it also establishes a negative for the use of threats or force to induce change. Therefore, EU’s guidelines for the promotion of a change of regime are:

- a) Intensification of the dialogue with Cuban authorities and society
- b) Reminding Cuban authorities about their responsibility to guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms
- c) Encouragement of a reform in national legislation

related to political and civil rights, in order to ensure and end to the harassment of political dissidents by the state

- d) Implementation of the same standards of evaluation used with other countries in the assessment of developments in domestic and foreign policies
- e) Delivery of ad hoc humanitarian aid through EU Member States
- f) Support of economic cooperation with Cuba through the MS encouraging economic openness

The Common Position also establishes the conditionality that further cooperation with Cuban authorities within a political and economic dialogue needs to be in accordance to the advances that the Cuban authorities might make towards democratic governance.

The nature of EU's involvement as a democracy promoter

Following the issue of the policy guidelines for the EU to promote democracy in Cuba in the Common Position, EU institutions and officials have remarked their commitment to a democratic transition in several statements and declarations. EU institutions and officials have been actively involved with the Cuban government and the Cuban people through programmes, actions and visits that define the nature of the role it is playing in Cuba's transition.

Up until the year 2000, EU's development aid in Cuba had mainly focused in humanitarian programmes. Since then humanitarian aid was changed for projects involving economic reforms and social development.

The main foreign policy tool for EU's promotion of democracy and human rights in third countries, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and its predecessor the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (1994-2000), started directing funds to Cuba only since 2001. Its implementation in Cuba comprises projects for the promotion of a culture of human rights and the support of a democratic process. Through the EIDHR the EU delivered to Cuba a total of 1, 185, 000 € in the years

of 2001, 2005, 2006 and 2008. In the year 2013, the EU published a tentative allocation of 300,000€ for Cuba and that same amount was set for allocation in 2014.

Through the 2002/2003 programme of Development Cooperation with Cuba the EU directed funds for the promotion of cooperation with the Cuban government in the media sector, and in other projects for economic and social development.

Later in 2003, the European Commission inaugurated its representation office in Havana. However, development cooperation in 2003 was suspended after the imprisonment of 75 political and human rights activists by the Cuban government in the spring of 2003, also called the Black Spring. The EU established an exception for the suspension of development cooperation in programmes with direct benefit for the Cuban population or programmes aimed to deliver meaningful contribution towards economic opening and reform in the regime.

The diplomatic measures taken by the EU in 2003 included the limitation of bilateral high-level government visits, the reduction of EU Member States participation in cultural events, the invitation of Cuban dissidents to national days' celebrations and the re-evaluation of the Common Position (which lead to continuous support and emphasis of its importance for constructing engagement). The response of the EU Presidency to the events of the Black Spring was the issue of a demarche to the Cuban government reaffirming its regret on the violation of the fundamental rights of opposition activists and a call for the release of all political prisoners.

Reactions from the Cuban government did not wait long and it denied normal access to its ministries for the representations of EU and EU Member States that adopted the aforementioned measures. Following this reaction from the Cuban government, the EU made a call to the local authorities to restore diplomatic relations in accordance to the Vienna Convention.

During the 14th evaluation of the Common Position

in 2004, the Council of the European Union (CoEU) expressed its concerns about the events of May that year when 16 journalist and activists were trialled and condemned. In this evaluation, the CoEU made a call on the Cuban government to immediately release all political prisoners. This evaluation also highlighted one constant aspect of EU's involvement in Cuba: the rejection of the use of coercive methods that would mean hardship for the Cuban people and the recognition that isolation would not contribute to an improvement of the overall situation of the Cuban people. On the other hand, the CoEU expressed its willingness to resume the political dialogue with the Cuban government reiterating that constructive engagement remains the basis of EU policy towards Cuba through means of dialogue to produce tangible results and urged Cuban officials to avoid obstructing EU and Member States' assistance in the sponsorship of cultural events.

In 2005 the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov prize to Damas de Blanco. In this year also, the diplomatic measures of 2003 were briefly suspended for the visit of Commissioner Louis Michel. During this visit Commissioner Michel met with Cuban government officials, with representatives of the Catholic Church and with prominent members of the peaceful opposition. In this meeting, the Cuban government agreed to continue bilateral dialogue on the subject of cooperation in judicial matters, elections and the situations in prisons. Later that year, the EU Presidency issued a declaration regarding the situation of Damas de Blanco and stated EU's commitment to the intensification of dialogue with the peaceful opposition and the civic society in Cuba.

In the period of 2005-2008 EU institutions continued to underline their commitment to the Common Position, to express their willingness for a renewal of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities, to issue documents and declarations calling on the regime to release political prisoners and to *“launch a process of political transition to a multi-party democracy, with participation and decision-making open to all Cubans on the basis of an open-ended dialogue that excludes no one”* (European

Parliament, 2007), and to stress their commitment to engage in dialogue with the civil society and the peaceful opposition.

Commissioner Michel paid another diplomatic visit to Cuba in 2008. During this visit he met with the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, and they agreed in a joint communiqué for bilateral relations to be based on the principles of the Charter of the UN; especial attention was given to matters of sovereignty and non-interference in a nation's internal affairs and abstention from threats or use of force in international relations. Later that year, the CoEU urged the Cuban regime to implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights¹; the CoEU also asserted that Cuban citizens have the right to *“decide independently about their future and [that the EU] remains ready to contribute positively to the future development of all sectors of Cuban society including through development cooperation instruments”* (Council of the European Union, 2008).

The diplomatic measures of 2003 were lifted in 2008 based on CoEU's objectives of pushing forward the political dialogue with the Cuban authorities. Since then development aid has been channelled through UN agencies and European NGOs for topics such as: response to hurricanes and disaster preparedness, food security, environment and culture, education and NGO initiatives. Political cooperation with the local government has been channelled through EU's Development Cooperation Instrument with programmes involving social cohesion and cultural initiatives. NGO initiatives received the smallest share of the budget, with a total of 4.4 million euros.

The conditions for the renewal of relations were established in a bilateral declaration in October 2008 (European Commission); these conditions included reciprocal and non-discriminative treatment of the parties, absolute observance and respect for sovereignty, non-interference in national internal affairs, and respect of political independence. Additionally, this declaration

established the framework for bilateral cooperation to be based in both parties' political independence, the absolute respect of national and communitarian legislations, cooperation in areas mutually agreed upon and beneficial for both parties and the goal of cooperation to be the development of these areas, and the promotion of meetings between officials. Commissioner Michel announced the European Commission's intention of funding cooperation areas with 20 to 25 million euros.

In a later visit in November that year the European Commission's Director General for Development, Stefano Manservigi, met with the Cuban Foreign Minister and the Minister for Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation to list the areas of bilateral cooperation following the renewal of cooperation. The areas listed were: Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Food Security, Trade, Environment, Research and Technology, Disaster preparedness and risk reduction, Culture and Support to Non-State Actors.

In the evaluation of the Common Position in June 2009, the CoEU declared that the EU *"will give high priority to the principles of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms"* and that high level meetings should always address the situation of human rights in Cuba. During this evaluation concern for the lack of advancement in human rights and political rights was expressed, as well as EU's intention to seek for appropriate opportunities for meeting with representatives of the peaceful democratic and a call to the Cuban authorities to allow unimpeded meetings with civic society was also made.

Through a resolution in 2010 the European Parliament urged the EU institutions to give their unconditional support and full encouragement to the launch of a peaceful process of political transition to a multi-party democracy in Cuba. The European Parliament made also a direct call to the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to immediately start a dialogue with the Cuban civil society and with those who support a peaceful transition under the framework of existing development mechanism, especially through the EIDHR.

In that same month, the European Commission released a Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative programme for 2011-2013 with Cuba in which 20 million euros were designated through the EU Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) in three priority sectors: Food Security, Environment and Adaptation to climate change, and Expertise exchanges, training and studies. No allusion was made to democracy promotion or civic society support in this document regarding policy coherence for development cooperation in these areas. The legal bases for the Response Strategy are articles 5 and 6 of the regulation for the DCI, where article 6 makes reference to the promotion of a political environment *"which guarantees peace and stability, respects for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democratic principles, rule of law, good governance and gender equality"* to be necessary for long-term development cooperation.

In 2010 the EU Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize of 2010 to Cuban dissident and former political prisoner, Guillermo Fariñas. The EU High Representative emphasized EU's intentions to continue bringing to attention the situation of human rights in Cuba in bilateral relations and high level meetings, and made a call for the unconditional release of all prisoners.

In 2012, the EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, issued a statement following the Cuban government's announcement of a new migration law, celebrating it as a step forward in fundamental rights for Cubans.

The year of 2013 was marked by the start of the process of negotiations in pursuit of bilateral Political Dialogue and Cooperation agreement between the EU and Cuba; in March that year the European Commission issued a recommendation for CoEU to authorise the start of negotiations.

During a visit in May 2013, for the celebration the Europe day, Mr. Christian Leffler, EEAS Managing Director for the Americas, talked about the transition experience of The experiences of post-socialist transitions in Central

CEE countries for the European Union. He also mentioned the importance of a democracy based on active participation and reliable institutions and highlighted the necessity of a democratic dialogue with citizens and transparent institutions in order to achieve economic and social objectives, as principles that will prevail in all negotiations with Cuba. In November 2013, Cuban non-governmental and governmental organizations participated in a seminar provided by the EU on Cooperation Instruments in Latin America and the Caribbean, where the possibilities of participating in thematic programmes with the EU for the period of 2014- 2020 were discussed.

The directives for starting negotiations towards a Cooperation agreement were established by the CoEU on February 2014 and the authorisation for the negotiations came on March that year, the directives were set to be based in the promotion of EU interests and values in Cuba and in the continuity of EU's policies objectives such as the support for on-going reform and modernisation, promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and political cooperation.

A new Multiannual Indicative Programme for the period of 2014- 2020 was issued by the European Commission, continuing cooperation on sustainable agriculture and food security, environment and climate change and support to sustainable economic and social modernisation.

According to this document, by the year 2014 EUR 86 million had been allocated for cooperation programmes and EUR 50 million more were expected for this period. This document mentioned that in the framework of the newly open negotiations for Political Dialogue and Cooperation agreement *“the strategic Objectives for EU relations with Cuba would be to encourage a process of reforms in Cuba, to engage in a political dialogue based on respect for human right, to strengthen cooperation in multilateral fora, to promote sustainable development, trade and economic relations, to support the Cuban development agenda and to foster regional cooperation”* (European Commission, 2014)

The first bilateral meeting for the negotiations took place on 29 April 2014 in Havana, led by EEAS Managing Director for the Americas and the Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister. In this first meeting the modalities and roadmap for negotiation were established. During the second meeting in Brussels on 27-28 August 2014, the issues of the future cooperation, trade and investment were address; according to EU documents, during this second meeting the subjects of politics and institutions were not mentioned.

The third round of bilateral negotiations planned to take place in December 2014 were postponed and re-scheduled for March 2015. Following the announcement, current EU High Representative celebrated the initiative for re-establishing US-Cuba relations and stressed that *“human rights remain at the heart of EU policy towards Cuba”* (EEAS, 2014)

DOES EU'S INVOLVEMENT IN CUBA RESEMBLE THE MOST SUCCESSFUL CASES OF EXTERNAL ACTORS' ENGAGEMENT IN CEE TRANSITIONS?

and Eastern Europe and the influence of external actors in them reveal patterns of involvement that shed light on

the types of interventions that have been closer to the most successful cases of democratic transitions. In the analysis

these patterns, Dr. Wade Jacoby (2006), developed a classification of the methods used by external actors for the promotion and implementation of democratic reforms in CEE Countries. According to Jacoby, the patterns found on external actors' involvement in CEE transition processes can be classified into three modes of influence: a) inspiration mode, b) coalition mode and c) substitution mode.

Since Jacoby's study found the coalition mode to be in the centre of post-communist reforms, the analysis of the characteristics of EU involvement in Cuba will be based mainly in the comparison of its numerous documents, declarations, actions and programmes against the characteristics of the characteristics of the coalition mode of influence.

Characterisation of EU's involvement in Cuba

The Common Position of 1996, its periodic evaluations through the years by the Council of the European Union, the diplomatic measures taken in 2003, the EU presidency declaration in 2003 regarding the implementation of the death penalty by the Cuban authorities, other EU Presidency demarches, the several calls of EU institutions and representatives on the Cuban government for the release of all political prisoners, EU's Presidency declaration about the situation of the Damas de Blanco in 2005, the documents derived from CoEU meetings, European Parliament's resolution and declarations of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EIDHR and the negotiations for a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, they have all in common the pursue of a democratic transition, political dialogue with the Cuban authorities, respect for human rights and political rights and engagement with the democratic opposition.

In the aforementioned documents the EU identifies itself as an eager and continuous promoter of a democratic transition for Cuba. In Jacoby's terms, this type of involvement becomes an active transference of ideas to domestic actors and the provision of moral support for like-minded groups. Through these documents the EU produces an image of being a strong external actor issuing

strong calls for the Cuban authorities to change policies and practices which are aligned with EU principles.

Most of the programmes and actions that have been directed to Cuba and which are related to some extent with the promotion of a democratic transition (explicitly mentioned in EU documents as institutional reforms and modernisation) can be classified as an active transference of ideas and knowledge and as the provision of financial, moral support and delivery of know-how. Examples of these actions and programmes comprise inclusion of Cuba in the EIDHR (2001-2014), the 2002/2003 development programme with Cuba focused in institutional reforms and capacity building, and within the Development Cooperation Instrument: the National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 and the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for Cuba in three areas: Food security, Environment and adaptation to climate change, and Expertise exchanges, trainings and studies.

Regarding the documented bilateral EU-Cuba meetings that took place in the island, all of them follow a similar dynamic: the EU representative meets with Cuban ministers, the two parties arrive to an agreement on areas of cooperation, both parties agree on the principle of non-intervention in a nation's internal affair and respect for sovereignty, and in some occasions the EU representative meets with relevant actors of the civic society. In these documented visits no allusion about dialogue regarding democratic transition, human or political rights having occurred is made (with the exception of the last visit of Mr. Christian Leffler in 2013). Even though no clear bilateral dialogue about democratic transition is mentioned, these visits can be classified as a passive transference of ideas due to the fact that, in bilateral agreements, the EU continues to stress its own principles of non-interference and respect for other party's sovereignty in accordance to international standards. During these visits the EU also provided significant financial, moral and know-how support, even when it is not specifically classified for democratic transition but for institutional reforms.

The award of the Sakharov prize in 2005 to the Damas de Blanco and in 2010 to Guillermo Fariñas is also a remarkable example of provision of moral support for Cuban democracy activists.

Although the documented actions and programmes are far from mirroring the numerous calls for action that EU institutions and representatives have made in documents and declarations, they do provide to a lesser extent the active transference and support for democratic transition that Jacoby found in external actors' coalition involvement.

Furthermore, on the subject of the Coalition mode condition of engaging with a like-minded domestic group, it is necessary to mention that the EU representatives have met with the local civic society supporting a democratic transition, although these occasions these occasions have been limited.

The newly started negotiations towards a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement can be identified as the offer of membership that until now has been discussed in terms on development and trade issues, but that the EU has intention of directing towards the subject of political and institutional reform.

The diplomatic measures taken by the EU in 2003 following the events of the so-called Black Spring, and which lasted five years, can be classified as imposed sanctions resembling the 'Substitution mode of influence'. The uni-directional character of the Common Position can also be classified as an imposed action. However, it is important to note that the measures were only of a diplomatic nature and that the provision of development aid delivered directly to the Cuban people has not been suspended over the years.

A successful coalition partner?

As it has been previously mentioned, the most successful cases of external actors involvement in CEE post-socialist transitions are characterised by the delivery of funding, expertise and moral support to local actors for the

promotion of a democratic reforms and transition, along with deep engagement with a like-minded active local group that is able to implement the reforms external actors recommend. In the case of CEE transitions, the optimal situation for success in external actors' involvement was the existence of a politically divided target government of a potential membership candidate (to an international organization); ideally the candidate state would have to be sufficiently close to membership to be motivated to implement the necessary reforms and sufficiently far so that threats of negotiation suspension would have credibility (Jacoby, 2006).

In the case of EU's involvement in Cuba it is possible to notice the delivery of funding and expertise in the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights only within the framework of the EIDHR. Funding and technical support in the achievement of other institutional reforms has been channelled through the Development Cooperation Instrument. Even so, significant results of the implementation of this instrument are yet to be seen.

The provision of moral support for like-minded groups can be found in the several declarations the EU institutions have made regarding the importance of support to the civic society, in the limited meetings EU representatives have held during official meetings and the awarding of the Sakharov prize to Damas de Blanco and Guillermo Fariñas. However, direct official engagement with the democratic opposition has been limited and mainly channelled through European NGOs and it thus remains far from being identified as a 'deep engagement'. Additionally, like-minded groups have been and still are vulnerable to intimidation by the local authorities and they lack of freedom of association and sufficient strength for working as an implementer of the reforms the EU promotes.

In the documented bilateral meetings and agreements although the Cuban authorities have stated several times to be open to political dialogue, they have also firmly called for the principle of non-interference in national affairs and non-intervention. This has been a persistent position of the Cuban officials that have met with EU representatives.

The position of the Cuban authorities during the evolution of negotiations for a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement is yet to be seen; but until now no significant presence of a politically divided target government is known.

Another characterization of the coalition mode of influence is the possibility of membership for the pre-transitioning State. The current EU invitation to establish a Cooperation Agreement can be regarded as the possibility of membership; according to EU documents, it is meant to further cooperation on trade and development matters but also on political and institutional issues. In terms of bi-regional cooperation, Cuba is already a member of most of these programmes (e.g. the EU-LAC strategic partnership, the Rio Group, the Caribbean-EU strategy and Cariforum). These programmes deal mostly with cooperation in environmental, economic and development matters although it is the intention of the CoEU to include promotion of democratic values, human rights and governance, among others, as its guiding principles. Cuba is also a member of the ACP group but not a signatory of the basic covenant for this partnership, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which consists in cooperation in political, development and trade issues.

The negotiations on a bilateral Cooperation Agreement open a window of opportunity to encourage democratic transition and institutional reforms through the offer of trade and development benefits. As the negotiations have only started and bilateral relations are positive, a situation where the Cuban government would be sufficiently close to sign an attractive agreement under the condition of certain institutional and democratic reforms remains a possibility. The relevance of this membership to push for democratic reforms will likely be based on the attractiveness of commercial benefits for Cuba, once the conditions for the agreement are set the potential of this instrument to promote democracy in Cuba will be clearer.

The comparison of EU involvement in Cuba with the involvement of Coalitional external actors in CEE

transitions reveals that:

- its engagement and moral support to like-minded groups is present but insufficient;
- the delivery of funding and expertise is also present but in the case of democratisation know-how it remains weak and it addresses specific training for the implementation of a democratic and institutional reforms through one sole instrument (EIDHR);
- the conditionality of membership has become possible thanks to the initiation of negotiations although the potentiality of membership to promote democratic reforms is yet to be seen;
- finally, a politically divided target government is no present yet, declarations within EU-Cuba meetings and outside them make clear that the authorities are not willing to jeopardize the current regime for the possibility of deeper cooperation with the EU.

Then, most of the conditions for EU involvement in Cuba resemble the most successful cases of external actors' involvement in CEE transitions but to a lesser extent. And even though the condition of a politically divided government remains absent, the EU has the potential to strengthen its engagement with like-minded domestic groups, to provide more actively and direct financial, moral and know-how support for the promotion of a democratic transition and to offer a sufficiently attractive possibility of membership that would encourage the implementation of democratic reforms. After almost 20 years, the EU is closer than ever to becoming a successful democracy promoter in Cuba. The current negotiations on Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement remain crucial for taking the EU closer to triggering significant democratic reforms.

Regarding the other modes of influence of external actors proposed by Jacoby, even when the two conditions of active and passive transference of ideas and knowledge of the Inspirational Mode are present, the absence of an active domestic group as the principal implementer of the reforms eliminates the possibility of the EU acting in this mode of influence. Additionally, the EU is engaging more actively than to be considered only an inspirational external actor.

The other 'mode of influence', called Substitution Mode, is characterised for distancing from the domestic context, implementing reforms in a top-down fashion, imposing sanctions and for the external actor being stronger than the domestic actors. Due to the several declarations and

documents expressing EU commitment to dialogue with the Cuban authorities and the Cuban people, along with the programmes and actions that engage the EU with both domestic actors its involvement in Cuba cannot be classified as substitution.

CONCLUSION

Complying with its self-appointed role of an international promoter of democracy and human rights, EU's policies and declarations regarding the political situation in Cuba constantly point out to the promotion of a democratic transition as the core principle of its involvement with the Cuban government and the Cuban people.

The study of the programmes and actions taken since the establishment of the Common Position of 1996 shows that there is a gap between the number of times the objective of promotion of a democratic transition is mentioned in EU documents and declarations when compared to the number of programmes and actions taken to pursue this objective. Sometimes the EU has carried out programmes with the Cuban government regardless of the programmes' condition of the observance of democratic values.

Nonetheless, EU can effectively be identified as a democracy promoter in Cuba. Its involvement in Cuba includes actions and programmes that can be classified as active and passive transferences of ideas and knowledge for a democratic transition and the EU has provided funding, know-how for institutional reforms and moral support for like-minded groups.

The analysis of the extent and nature of its involvement sheds light on the effectiveness of its support for a democratic transition. Resembling the Coalition mode of involvement found at the centre of democratisation processes in CEE countries, the EU has taken actions to engage with domestic like-minded groups, it has provided financial support and know-how to the

government and the civic society, it has also provided moral support for the peaceful opposition and it has offered Cuba the possibility of a formal partnership. However, this resemblance falls short and insufficient for triggering significant democratic reforms.

On the side of the characteristics of the domestic actors, the existence of a politically divided target government cannot currently be foreseen.

The newly open negotiations for a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement represent an opportunity for the EU to advance in its objective of promoting a democratic transition in Cuba. The conditions to be established in this Cooperation Agreement will determine whether the EU gets closer to resembling a successful Coalition partner or not. Until the conditions of the Cooperation Agreement are defined, the EU would have to implement programmes and actions that are congruent, in quantity and quality, with its own documents and declarations guiding its involvement in Cuba and that strengthen its engagement with local democracy supporters and its provision of technical support in order to become a successful coalition partner in Cuba's democratic transition.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arias-King, F. (2005). *Transiciones, La experiencia de Europa del este*. Buenos Aires: CADAL, Pontis, CEON.
- Atanasova, G. &. (2009). The role of external actors in civil society building: the case of the Republic of Macedonia. *CEU Political Science Journal*, 48-75.
- Council of the European Union. (1996). 96/697/CFSP: *Common Position of 2 December 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on Cuba*. Obtained EUR-Lex Access to the European Union Law: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31996E0697>
- Council of the European Union. (23-24 de June de 2008). *Council Conclusions on Cuba, 2881st AGRICULTURE and FISHERY Council Meeting. Luxembourg*.
- Duarte Peña, I. (2007). International organizations fostering democracy ,at home': from silent players to salient players. *Desafíos*, 31- 75.
- EEAS. (17 de December de 2014). *Statement of the High Representative and Vice President Federica Mogherini on US-Cuba relations*. Obtenido de http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2014/141217_03_en.htm
- European Commission. (28 de October de 2008). *Déclaration concernant la reprise de la coopération entre la Commission Européenne et la République de Cuba. Havana*.
- European Commission. (1 de January de 2014). <http://ec.europa.eu/>. Obtenido de http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multi-annual-indicative-programme-mip-cuba-2014-2020_en
- European Parliament. (8 de May de 2001). *Promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries*. Obtenido de http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/human_rights_in_third_countries/r10
- European Parliament. (21 de June de 2007). *Cuba, European Parliament resolution of 21 June 2007 on Cuba*.
- Jacoby, W. (2006). Inspiration, Coalition and Substitution: External Influences on Postcommunist Transformations. *World Politics*, 623- 651.
- Kelley, J. (2004). International actors on the domestic scene: membership conditionality and socialization by internal institutions. *International Organization*, 425-457.
- Kornai, J. (2004). What countries embarking on a post-socialist transformation learn from the experience so far? *Cuban transition project, University of Miami*, 1-40.
- Stewart, J. (2009). The interplay of domestic context and external democracy promotion: lessons from Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. *Democratization*, 804- 824.

HTURIDKSLAKFJAI
CXMYVBVUWIOZA
HFHYMIGLVXVLD
BIGZREDSYXCVGLI
HTURIDKSLAKFJAI
CXMYVBVUWIOZA
HFHYMEU'SVXVLD
BIINVOLVEMENTLE
YMPROMOTINGIVJ
BA DEMOCRATICIR
LIV TRANSITIONLC
RWMLIN CUBA MLIQ
BXMGJLITUREFXVC
AVNCBXVYGDTEZR
HTURIDKSLAKFJAI
CXMYVBVUWIOZA
HFHYMIGLVXVLD
BIGZREDSYXCVGLI

LATIN-AMERICAN INSIGHT

“Latin America has ceased to be outside the global geopolitical interests and has become an attractive region, both economically and for its potential in terms of the ability to weigh the balance of power in the world. While there are a few strategic association treaties between the U.S. and the European Union and some Latin American countries, a lot remains to be done on

integration matter. Countries like Venezuela and Cuba remain in a deep uncertain process of political and social transformation that moves them away from the trend towards integration. The „Latin American Insight“ aims to open lines of analysis on these issues and raise the level of knowledge about Latin American reality in the Czech Republic.”

Carlos González

Head of the Center for Research and Analysis

Casla Institute

Phone: (+420) 286 001 468

E-mail: office@caslainstitute.org

Address: Lovosická 559/32, 190 00, Prague 9 Czech Republic

Website: www.caslainstitute.org

Facebook: www.facebook.com/caslainstitute

Twitter: www.twitter.com/caslainstitute

YouTube: www.youtube.com/caslainstitute

This publication has been prepared as a part of the Latin American Insight project created for the purpose of analyzing current Latin American issues. The views expressed by the author in this study don't necessarily reflect the views of Casla Institute.